

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

OMB-01 SAJ-01 AID-05 ACDA-05 MC-02 /083 W

----- 125659

R 160551Z SEP 75

FM AMEMSASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 741

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NICOISIA

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION USNATO

AMCONSUL ADANA

AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

AMCONSUL IZMIR

EUCOM

CINCUSAFE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 7076

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, TU, CY

SUBJ: TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS VS A CYPRUS COMPROMISE

1. AS IN THE RECENT 194- DAY GOVERNMENT CRISIS, WHEN TURKISH NATIONAL INTERESTS DRIFTED WHILE PARTISAN GAINS WERE PURSUED, THE POLITICS-AS-USUAL APPROACH OF TURKEY'S POLITICAL LEADERS WAS AGAIN REFLECTED IN THE GOT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO JOIN DENKTASH IN TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCUSSING TERRITORY WITH CLERIDES BEFORE OR DURING THE NEW YORK TALKS. THE PLACING OF PARTISAN POLITICS ABOVE NATIONAL

INTEREST HAS PLAGUED THE CYPRUS ISSUE THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR, START-

ING WITH ECEVIT'S RESIGNATION (IN THE HOPE OF GAINING STRENGTH IN EARLY ELECTIONS) LAST SEPT 17.

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2. CLEARLY THE ARMS EMBARGO HAS BOTH ADDED TO THE POLITICAL RISKS OF MAKING CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS AND STIRRED SULLEN RESISTANCE AND RESENTMENT AMONG THE LEADERS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS TO THE CREDIT OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND ITS PREDECESSOR THAT THEY SHOWED RESTRAINT IN RETALIATING AGAINST THE U.S. PRESENCE HERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE EMBARGO, WHEN THEY COULD HAVE INDULGED IN CHEAP POLITICS AT OUR EXPENSE. BUT DURING A PERIOD WHEN TURKEY'S NATIONAL INTEREST IN A CYPRUS SETTLE-

MENT HAS BEEN IN NEED OF BOLD LEADERSHIP TO BUILD SUPPORT AND ISOLATE OPPOSITION TO A COMPROMISE, THERE HAS BEEN A NEAR-TOTAL REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY OF THE POLITICAL RISKS INVOLVED.

3. AGAINST THE DISCOURAGING HISTORY OF THE LAST YEAR, THE KEY QUESTION NOW IS: WHEN COULD TURKEY'S DOMESTIC POLITICS PERMIT THE GOT TO COMPROMISE ON CYPRUS? THE TURKISH SIDE AT NEW YORK MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO RPT NO CHANGE IN THE GOT POSITION CAN BE EXPECTED BEFORE THE OCTOBER 12 ELECTIONS FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE SENATE. THE IMPACT OF THOSE ELECTIONS ON THE DEMIREL GOVT, AS NOTED IN ANKARA 6935, COULD RANGE FROM REINFORCING IT TO GRAVELY WEAKENING IT. IN TERMS OF CYPRUS

POLICY, THE BROAD ALTERNATIVES APPEAR TO BE THESE:

A. DEMIREL WINS (I.E., HIS JUSTICE PARTY TAKES A RESPECTABLE PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VOTE IN COMPARISON WITH THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, AND ERBAKAN'S NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE ITS PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE)--

(1) IF BY THAT TIME THE ARMS EMBARGO HAS BEEN LIFTED, DEMIREL WOULD HAVE GREATER FREEDOM TO MAKE AN EFFORT FOR A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.

HE COULD TRY THE INTER-PARTY COMMITTEE APPROACH THAT CAGLAYANGIL MENTIONED TO SAUVAGNARGUES (STATE 215656). HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION HAS

TURNED DOWN HIS PREVIOUS REQUESTS FOR COLLABORATION BY REMINDING HIM THAT HE ALREADY HAS A COALITION AND IT IS THE GOVT'S DUTY TO MAKE POLICY AND THE OPPOSITION'S DUTY TO SIT IN JUDGMENT. THUS AT SOME POINT DEMIREL PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO TAKE ON HIMSELF THE DISTASTEFUL

RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CYPRUS COMPROMISE. IN ANY EVENT, SHOULD HE WIN THE ELECTION AND SHOULD THE EMBARGO BE REMOVED, WE THINK HE WILL MAKE CONFIDENTIAL

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AN INCREASED "TRY". THE OUTCOME OF SUCH A "TRY" REMAINS, OF COURSE, UNCERTAIN.

(2) IF THE EMBARGO IS MAINTAINED, ITS MULTIFACETED AND GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES (ANKARA 6860 & 6861) WOULD TEND BOTH TO ABSORB THE GOT'S FULL ATTENTION AND PROBABLY TO STIFFEN ITS RESISTANCE TO MAKING CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS. WE DO NOT COMPLETELY RULE OUT THE THEORY THAT ONCE HAVING "PROVED ITS VERIL-

ITY" BY MOVING VERY HARD AGAINST US, IT MIGHT FEEL FREER TO GIVE CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS; BUT WE DO NOT PLACE MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THIS POSSIBILITY.

B. ELECTIONS PRODUCE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE--

(1) IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, WE BELIEVE DEMIREL WOULD ATTEMPT

TO RESOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE POLITICAL STRENGTH HE NOW HAS. WHILE HIS CHANCES OF SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE AS GOOD AS IF HE HAD WON THE ELECTION, HE WOULD AT LEAST BE FREE OF THE CURRENT ELECTION PRESSURES.

(2) IF THE EMBARGO IS MAINTAINED, ITS GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE AS OUTLINED IN ANKARA 6860 AND 6861).

C. DEMIREL LOSES (I.E., HIS PRINCIPAL COMPETITOR, ECEVIT'S REPUBLI-

CA PEOPLE'S PARTY, AND PERHAPDPHE RIGHT-WING NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY

AS WELL, WINS A MARKEDLY LARGER SHARE OF THE VOTE AT THE JUSTICE PARTY

EXPENSE)--THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BE THE MAIN ALTERNATIVE LINES THAT DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT THEN FOLLOW:

(1) DEMIREL COULD HANG ON AS LONG AS HIS WEAKENED COALITION HELD TOGETHER. THE INCREASED ASSERTIVENESS OF A STRENGTHENED NSP IN THE COALITION AND A STRENGTHENED RPP IN OPPOSITION WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A SEVERE DISABILITY IN DEALING WITH CYPRUS AND WITH VIRTUALLY EVERY OTHER

SUBJECT. THUS THE GOVT WOULD BE IN A STATE OF NEAR-PARALYSIS IN WHICH,

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EVEN IF THE EMBARGO WERE LIFTED, DEMIREL WOULD HAVE LITTLE CAPACITY TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONFIRMATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD HAVE THE ADDED NEGATIVE EFFECTS CITED IN B (2).

(2) THE DEMIREL GOVT COULD RESIGN AND BECOME A CARETAKER GOVT WHILE THE PARTIES AGAIN SEARCH FOR A COALITION FORMULA. THE CARETAKE GOVT WOULD BE IN AN EVEN MORE PRONOUNCED STATE OF PARALYSIS THAN THE ONE DESCRIBED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGAPH. MOREOVER, AS THE PARLIAMENTARY NUMBERS SITUATION IS ALMOST EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS IN THE LAST GOVT CRISIS, THERE IS REAL PROSPECT THAT THE CRISIS WOULD BE SIMILARLY

PROLONGED WHILE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AGAIN FAILS TO PRODUCE ANY GOVT--OR AT LEAST ONE THAT CAN GOVERN EFFECTIVELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE THAT THIS TIME WE WOULD SEE THE EMERGENCE OF AN ECEVIT-DEMIREL COALITION WHICH COULD PRODUCE A STRONG

GOVT CAPABLE OF BEING CONCILIATORY ON CYPRUS. BUT DEMIREL'S LOSS OF THE SENATE ELECTION TO ECEVIT WOULD DISCOURAGE ECEVIT FROM COOPERATING

WITH DEMIREL AND WOULD LIKELY ENCOURAGE ECEVIT TO PRESS FOR NEW GENERAL ELECTIONS. THUS THIS PROSPECT, WHICH CANNOT BE ENTIRELY RULED OUT, IS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN IT WAS UNDER EARLIER CONDITIONS. IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE ALSO FOR THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT THIS TIME--ALTHOUGH THEY REJECTED IT LAST YEAR--AN "ABOVE PARTIES" GOT THAT COULD HAVE FREEDOM TO DEAL WITH CYPRUS. AGAIN, IF EITHER OF

THESE TWO TYPES OF GOVT EMERGED, THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE WOULD BE MATERIALLY AFFECTED BY WHETHER OR NOT THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN REPEALED.

(3) IN PLACE OF A LENGTHY GOVT CRISIS, PARLIAMENT MIGHT BE PREPARED

TO CALL NEW GENERAL ELECTIONS, WHICH NEARLY ALL OBSERVERS AGREE ARE THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE. IF NEW ELECTIONS PRODUCE THE SAME KIND OF EQUIVOCAL RESULTS AS IN 1973, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION WOULD OF COURSE BE NOT RPT NO BETTER. BUT IF THE RESULT IS DECISIVELY IN FAVOR OF EITHER DEMIREL'S JP OR ECEVIT'S RPP, THERE WOULD BE THE PROSPECT OF A GOVT EMERGING THAT COULD ACT MORE FORCEFULLY

THAN THOSE WE HAVE SEEN THE PAST YEAR.

D. AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, THE MILITARY COULD INTERVENE. A
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MILITARY-BACKED GOVT COULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE CYPRUS CONCESSIONS WITHOUT UNDUE CONCERN AS TO POLITICAL RISKS. BUT SUCH A GOVT, DEPENDING ON ITS MAKEUP AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD ALSO END UP TAKING A VERY HARD LINE ON CYPRUS. THUS A MILITARY INTERVENTION, WHILE BRINGING WITH IT MANY OBVIOUS AND OVERRIDING NEGATIVES, OFFERS NO RPT NO ASSURANCE OF A MORE FLEXIBLE PERFORMANCE ON THIS.

4. SUMMING UP, WE BELIEVE THAT (PROVIDED THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED) THREE OF THE ABOVE POSSIBLE SITUATIONS OFFER THE PROSPECT OF AN IMPROVED GOT EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS. THESE ARE:

(A) IF DEMIREL WINS THE UPCOMING SENATORIAL ELECTIONS;
(B) IF THE ELECTIONS PRODUCE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION; OR (3) IF NEW GENERAL ELECTIONS ARE HELD AND ARE DECISIVE IN FAVOR OF EITHER ECEVIT OR DEMIREL. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER,

WE CAN HAVE NO ASSURANCE AT THIS TIME THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT SEE TUR-

KEY FALL INTO THE OTHER SITUATIONS WE HAVE LISTED WHICH ARE FAR LESS PROMISING.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL STABILITY, POLICIES, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 SEP 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975ANKARA07076
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750321-0419
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750946/aaaabogd.tel
Line Count: 222
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <01 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS VS A CYPRUS COMPROMISE
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, TU, CY
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006